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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
a return to the old standard was proper, if not because it was a good standard,
then because of an absence of a better one. This legislation was presumed to be
constitutional, that is, presumed to be supported by facts known to the Legis-
lature, and "while this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality would
have to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.12 This could not be done.
Appellants argued that there was inequality as between landlords and tenants
in the statute. Their argument was that in different assessing units the ratio
between using the 1954 rate and using the "most recent" equalization rate would
not be uniform, and that in some parts of the state landlords would be
receiving large profits while in others they would not be receiving a fair
rate of return. This argument was answered by the Court in two ways: first,
"the fact that the 1954 equalization acts do not reflect the full underassess-
ments in certain areas is unfortunate, but it had to be viewed by the Legislature
in the light of the effect on tenants generally if the revised acts were used,"'1
and second, the precedent of the recent Abroino case which foreshadowed this
decision.
In Four Maples Drive Realty Corp. v. Abromo,14 the Court held that
the mere fact that the particular legislation under consideration did not affect
all areas uniformly does not render it unconstitutional upon equal protection
grounds "since the fact that the legislation does not affect all areas uniformly
may furnish the necessary means of giving equal protection to all persons."
Under these considerations, this court, cognizant of its own obligation toward
legislative enactments, upheld the constitutionality of this statute. Appellants'
arguments, although well conceived, fell short of rebutting the presumption
of constitutionality. The 1954 rate is not the best, but it is as the Court states,
simple, objective, and readily ascertainable, making it therefore practical and
feasible.'5 If a different and perhaps more complicated rate was desired, the
Legislature could have turned to the method used in condemnation or tax
certiorari proceedings, but this was intentionally avoided. It remains for the
Legislature to turn again to this problem, and establish a rate which cannot
be said to be archaic,16 and yet will be reasonable and fair.
B.B.F.
MOTORIST DENIED RIGHT TO COUNSEL PRIOR TO SOBRIETY TEST
A motorist, placed under arrest for driving while intoxicated, was asked
by police to submit to a sobriety test. By provision of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law, refusal to take the test is cause for the administrative revocation of an
12. Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, at 218, 149 N.E.2d 869, at 871, 173
N.Y.S.2d 579, at 582 (1958).
13. Bucho, supra note 10, at 477, 184 N.E.2d at 573, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
14. 2 A.D.2d 753, 153 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1955); motion for leave to appeal
denied, 2 N.Y.2d 707, 138 N.E.2d 345, 163 N.Y.S.2d xc; appeal dismissed, 2 N.Y.2d 837,
140 N.E.2d 870, 159 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1957), appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 14 (1956).
15. Bucho, supra note 10, at 477, 184 N.E.2d at 573, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
16. Bucho, supra note 10, at 479, 184 N.E.2d at 574, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
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operator's license.1 The suspect conditioned his submission to the test on being
allowed to consult his attorney. The police denied his request to telephone,
whereupon he refused to take the test. All this occurred well within the two
hour limit set upon administration of an admissible test.2 Without this req-
uisite evidence3 the criminal charge failed. However, for his refusal, the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, after a hearing, revoked the unwilling motor-
ist's license. Upon a petition to review this determination, the lower court
annulled the revocation. On appeal, held, reversed and the Commissioner's
order reinstated (memorandum decision), two judges concurring in an opinion.
Denial of counsel does not render the subsequent refusal of a sobriety test
an improper ground for the revocation of an operator's license by an adminis-
trative proceeding. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 181 N.E.2d 427, 226
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962) (mem.).
In criminal proceedings, especially in the early stages, the right to counsel
has received growing protection. Post-arraignment admissions made in the
absence of counsel are now inadmissible.4 Even in earlier stages the denial of
counsel when combined with such other deficiencies as the youth or mental in-
capacity of an accused may affect a confession to the extent of rendering it
constitutionally involuntary.5 Precisely in the instance where an accused
inquires as to his right to have counsel before being required to make a state-
ment, a statement secured by a failure to advise him of his rights cannot be
used.6 The rationale behind this trend is that the accused, in the face of un-
challenged official detention and interrogation, all too easily may conclude that
he is under a duty to inform the police about the crime, even his own crime.
Instead, the law interposes his attorney authoritatively to advise the accused of
his privilege against incriminating himself. This purpose is all the more neces-
sary where at arraignment the power and skill of the State are declared to be
against the probable criminal. In comparable civil situations the denial of
counsel has long been allowed. Judicial and legislative investigating committees
may exclude the counsel for a witness summoned before them.7 This is so in
spite of the apparent object of the committee's investigation, the gathering of
facts for eventual prosecution perhaps of the very witness who appears before
them without counsel. The justification given for such in camera procedure
is that the accused has a sufficient shield in his privilege against self-crimination,
which right is presumably well known. Under the statutory characterization
of the procedure to revoke a license for refusing a blood test, that it is a civil
1. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194.
2. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192.
3. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192.
4. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N.Y.2d 279, 183 N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1962);
People v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 182 N.E.2d 103, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1962).
5. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
6. People v. Noble, 9 N.Y.2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451, 216 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1961).
7. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
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administrative proceeding reviewable as such,8 there is, according to existing
law, no right to counsel before making a choice regarding the test.
Sobriety test legislation has not been entirely without its constitutional
faults. When first written, without both an arrest provision and the requirement
of a hearing, the statute was struck down. Although attacked as an invasion of
the privilege against self-crimination and a deprivation of the so-called freedom
from bodily invasion, it has been upheld as constitutional. The United States
Supreme Court has inferentially approved sobriety test legislation even of the
kind requiring a choice to risk conviction by submitting to a test or face civil
loss of an operator's license by refusing the test.' 0 However, the argument that
the statute may so operate as to deprive a suspect of his right to counsel has
apparently never been squarely answered before now."
In the instant case the Court answered the question only by way of a
memorandum. There was no invasion of the petitioner's constitutional rights
by denying him counsel prior to requiring him to choose to take or decline the
test. His refusal based upon this denial was not a conditional refusal to be
distinguished from the refusal specified in the statute as ground for revocation
of his license administratively. The concurring opinion volunteers the warning
that if the petitioner stood before the Court convicted of the crime of intoxi-
cated driving, then the deprivation of counsel would require reversal. However,
the characterization of the revocation proceeding as civil prevented disagree-
ment.
Prior to the time a choice regarding the test is compelled, there are the
marks of arrest, detention, and interrogation for a crime. If this time were to
fix the character of the procedure and, thus, the right to counsel, then even
under existing law the accused would be entitled to counsel. That this time
is critical is obvious. If the accused is realistically to choose regarding the test,
he must be informed concerning what is considered intoxicaton under the law,
what the legal efficacy of the test is, and in what manner the test must be ad-
ministered. The accused also has the right by statute to have a private test
taken as a check against the official, a prerogative about which he is probably
uninformed. In short an informed choice, indeed, a meaningful right to choose
depends upon the accused's access to competent advice, the only certain source
of which is his attorney. The state, by setting this early time for the gathering
of requisite evidence, in effect has limited the opportunity to have counsel to
relatively insignificant post-test proceedings. This analysis becomes more
meaningful, when it is realized that the ordinary protections available to
an accused at the early stages of criminal proceedings and in investigatory
proceedings are removed because of the nature of the evidence sought by the
8. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 510(6).
9. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
10. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 & n.2 (1957).
11. Contra, Zdan v. Kelly, 4 A.D.2d 1004, 168 N.Y.S.2d 310 (4th Dep't 1957)
(mem.); see Coleman v. Kelly, 12 Misc. 2d 116, 175 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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test. The accused may not assert the privilege against self-incrimination nor the
privilege against unwarranted bodily invasion; the present case law removes
these. An argument that compelling a choice regarding the test is an unwar-
ranted search and seizure has been answered by including an arrest provision
in the statute. Yet, the very cure for this ill recognizes the nature of the pro-
cedure as criminal and simply accomplishes the withdrawal of a constitutional
right without replacing any comparably effective protection, such as the
right to counsel. Perhaps the easiest criticism to be leveled against the Court's
decision is that it was unnecessary to serve the purposes of the statute. Re-
gardless of the interposition of counsel, intoxicated drivers will be removed,
by the administrative revocation of their license or by criminal conviction,
from the highway. The right to counsel will simply make their removal less
arbitrary. The decision does evoke a distaste, though, for needlessly summary
law enforcement. The sobriety test procedure has but one object, the removal
of the intoxicated driver from our highways. There is one principal means by
which this is accomplished, revocation of the important privilege of driving.
Even in civil revocation the implicit ground for revocation is common to the
fault evoking the criminal penalty, presumably the motorist who refuses the
test is intoxicated. The sobriety test procedure can at best be called chameleon,
but certainly not entirely civil in its nature. From the standpoint of the time
when the statutory choice is required, then, the civil characterization of the sub-
sequent revocation proceeding is irrelevant. If the right to counsel is to be
fixed according to that point in the procedure at which it is asserted or even
according to the nature of the procedure viewed as a whole, the motorist ac-
cused of intoxicated driving should be allowed counsel prior to choosing to take
or decline a sobriety test.
D.R.K.
CONTRACTS
BAILEE LIABLE FOR FAILURE TO RECOVER GOODS ATTACHED BY ERRONEOUS
PROCESS
Plaintiff-seller sued to recover damages sustained as a result of the al-
leged breach by the defendant-buyer of two agreements, under each of which
certain tinplate belonging to the plaintiff was stored in a warehouse of a third
party in Naples, Italy. The tinplate had been a part of certain sales by defend-
ant to defendant's customer. After the arrival of the goods in Italy, the
customer rejected the goods. Following such rejection the plaintiff-seller and
defendant-buyer reached two agreements-the purpose of which was to provide
for adjustments satisfactory to the three merchants involved. Each agreement
provided for plaintiff-seller to give defendant-buyer certain monetary credits,
and for defendant-buyer to make repayment to the customer. Title to the re-
jected goods reverted to the seller, but the defendant-buyer, who undertook to
